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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Voting Rights-Legislative election of a gov-
ernor in default of a victor in the popular election does not violate the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
Petitioners, who are qualified Georgia voters, attempted to enjoin the
Georgia legislature from exercising its power pursuant to the state's
Constitution to elect a governor from the two candidates receiving the
greatest number of popular votes when no one candidate received a ma-
jority of the votes in the general election. 1 It was contended by petitioners
that this provision of the Georgia Constitution was violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution as interpreted in Gray v. Sanders.2 It was also argued that the
provision was unconstitutional (as to the federal Constitution) as applied
because the present Georgia legislature is malapportioned,8 and because
the Democratic legislators would be acting under a prior pledge to support
the candidate endorsed by that party.4
1. GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4:
How returns published.-The members of each branch of the General Assembly
shall convene in the Representative Hall, and the President of the Senate and
Speaker of the House of Representatives shall open and publish the returns in the
presence and under the direction of the General Assembly; and the person having
the majority of the whole number of votes, shall be declared duly elected Governor
of this State; but, if no person shall have such majority, then from the two persons
having the highest number of votes, who shall be in life, and shall not decline an
election at the time appointed for the General Assembly to elect, the General
Assembly shall immediately, elect a Governor viva voce; and in all cases of
election of a Governor by the General Assembly, a majority of the numbers present
shall be necessary to a choice.
The popular votes in the November 8, 1966 election were allocated thus:
Howard H. Callaway ................................ 449,894 Votes or 47.07%
Lester G. Maddox .................................. 448,044 Votes or 46.88%
Ellis G. Arnold .................................... 57,832 Votes or 6.05%
2. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). This case proscribed the "county unit" system used in Georgia
at the time to nominate candidates for governor and senator and other statewide offices. The
system operated so that the candidate who received the most votes carried the county. A
formula weighted the value of the counties' vote in favor of rural areas. The Court held that
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
requires that "once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is
designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote . . . ." [Emphasis
added.] The county unit system violates this principle by weighing votes and by eliminating
any effect of those votes cast for the candidate receiving a minority of each county's votes.
3. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621 (1965). Petitioners' argument was that if the
legislature does not properly represent the people of Georgia it should not be permitted to
execute the duties of a legitimate legislature.
4. The pledge reads: "I further pledge myself to support at the General Election of
November 8, 1966, all candidates nominated by the Democratic Party of the State of
Georgia." Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 241 (1966). The substance of this argument was
that since the legislature was predominantly Democratic and these legislators were bound
to vote for a certain candidate they could not act as free agents as contemplated by article
V and the outcome would be predetermined.
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The Court held in a five-to-four opinion that the power granted to the
legislature by article V of the state's Constitution and the exercise of that
power would not violate the right of equal protection of the laws or any
other right guaranteed by the United States Constitution.5
Justice Black, writing for the majority, characterized the act of the
legislature in default of a victor in the general election as a "second
method," an "alternative way," to elect the governor.6 He concluded that
Gray v. Sanders' "was only a voting case" requiring that Georgia "elimi-
nate the county-unit machinery from its election system."' "This case,
as was emphasized, had to do with the equal right of 'all who participate
in the election,' . . to vote and have their votes counted without impair-
ment or dilution."9 Since the people, as such, do not participate in the
legislative "way" of election, their rights as established in Gray have no
relevance; this is not a popular. election.' °
After declaring that article V did not on its face violate the United
States Constitution, Justice Black proceeded to explain why it would not
be unconstitutional as applied in this instance. He admitted that the
Georgia legislature was malapportioned and did not properly represent
the voters of that state." However, he stated that "in Toombs v. Fort-
son 12 . . . we held that with certain exceptions, not here material, the
Georgia Assembly could continue to function until May 1, 1968.'1 Fur-
thermore, concerning the pledge of the Democratic legislators to support
the Party nominee in the general election, Justice Black determined that
"that election is over, and with it, terminated any promises by the Dem-
ocratic legislators to support the Democratic nominee."" [Emphasis
added.]
Justice Douglas, dissenting with three other Justices, refutes Justice
Black's basic premise that this is an "alternative way" of electing a gov-
ernor. Since the legislature is limited to choosing from the two candidates
who received the highest number of votes in the popular election, the
legislature's act is merely the final step in the popular election process.
Under this view of the facts, it is undeniable that certain members of the
5. 385 U.S. at 236.
6. Id. at 234.
7. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
8. 385 U.S. at 234. See note 2 supra and the discussion of the county unit system.
9. 385 U.S. at 233.
10. Justice Black stated, 385 U.S. at 233, "The District Court erroneously relies on
Gray v. Sanders ... for striking down Article V of the State's Constitution."
11. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621 (1965). As Justice Fortas declares in the present
case, "A majority of the legislators in Georgia's legislature may represent a minority of the
voters." 385 U.S. at 244.
12. 384 U.S. 210 (1966).
13. 385 U.S. at 235.
14. Ibid.
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electorate will be denied the right protected by Gray v. Sanders"s: "to vote
and have their votes counted without impairment or dilution," The pro-
cedure here operates, in effect, in the same manner as the county unit
system proscribed in the Gray case.' 6
The most significant issue decided in this case is whether legislative
election of a state governor in default of a victor in the popular election
violates the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection of the
laws.17
In Gray the Court held that the "county-unit system" of nominating
statewide officials-governor, senator, etc.-violated the equal protection
clause. This system operated so that the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes within a county carried the whole county. The fourteenth
amendment requires that "once the geographical unit for which a repre-
sentative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election
are to have an equal vote ... , s This constitutional standard is violated
because "the county unit system entirely disregards all votes in each
county not cast for the prevailing candidate."' 9 "According to Gray v.
Sanders, any electoral college system denies equality.""
In the instant case the "geographical unit for which a representative is
to be chosen" is the State of Georgia and the representative is the gov-
ernor. The act of the legislature is merely the consummation of the popu-
lar election and an integral part of it. This conclusion is unavoidable.
Originally, Georgia left the election of a governor to the legislature.2
By constitutional amendment in 1824 the election of the governor was
entrusted entirely to the people and only in the event of a deadlock in the
general election would the legislature act, and then only as one of two
stages of a popular election.2 The legislators act as representatives of
15. 385 U.S. at 233.
16. 385 U.S. at 240.
17. Neither the issue of the Democratic legislator's party oath (see note 4, supra). nor
the issue of this particular legislature's malapportionment (see note 3, supra) is of extended
prospective importance. The problem of the oath might have been amenable to an equitable
charge on those legislators as representatives of all the people of the state. Unless it could
have been neutralized in some way it would probably have been a sufficient independent
ground for denying the Georgia legislature the right to act under article V. Since all state
legislatures are bound to be apportioned in the near future in accordance with the "one
man, one vote" rule, the identical problem presented here will probably not arise again.
Whether or not to permit the de facto status here is a matter completely within the Court's
equitable discretion and is, at best, only arguable in a given case.
18. 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
19; Pollak, The Supreme Court 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REv. 62, 132 (1965).
20b. Avins, Gray v. Sanders-A Co;istitutional Footnote, 26 ALABAMaA LAW. 82, 84 (1965).
.21. 385 U.S. at 238. Prior to the amendment legislative election of the governor
proceeded. thus: the House selected three candidates from which the Senate chose a
govern6r. The nature of the legislature's function has now been completely changed.
22. 385 U.S. at 238.
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the people in the fashion of an electoral college. As a result, the entire
electorate of Georgia are "all who participate in the election" even when
the legislature acts pursuant to article V. The pre-conditions to the ap-
plication of the Gray rule are, thus, satisfied by the Georgia election pro-
cedure.
However, the rule of "an equal vote" without impairment or dilution
is not satisfied. As revealed in the District court's opinion each legislator
casts all the votes of his constituency as a unit. His vote, whether for the
candidate receiving the majority or the candidate receiving the minority
of his constituents' votes necessarily "eliminates" the will of those who
voted for the other candidate.23 Therefore, article V on its lace violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution.
Justice Black has avoided this conclusion by imposing upon the
Georgia election procedure the artificial characterization of an alternative
method of electing a governor. The legislative act is an integral part of
the popular election process and the real question is: should the protection
of the Gray case be extended to cover the present situation? When this
question is considered in the light of prior cases confirming the sanctity
of voting rights the answer is an axiomatic yes! Chief Justice Warren
stated in Reynolds v. Sims24
... history has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the
right of suffrage in this country. The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society
and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of repre-
sentative government. 2
5
As Justice Fortas declared in his dissent in the present case, the Court
has made "a startling reversal" from the position of prior decisions.26
Why the Court has refused to extend the Gray principle to this case is not
obvious from Justice Black's opinion. However, certain statements by the
Court suggest possible motives. It is recognized that runoffs or new elec-
tions are costly in time and money; that the practice of legislative election
of governors has long been accepted in this country; and also, that thirty-
nine other states have similar statutory or constitutional provisions allow-
ing their legislatures to act in case of a deadlock in the popular election for
23. Morris v. Fortson, 262 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. Ga., 1966).
24. 377 U.S. 533 (1963).
25. Id. at 555.
26. 385 U.S. at 249. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 633 (1966);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1963); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1938); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1914).
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governor." However, only two of these states (Mississippi and Vermont)
require a majority of votes for election while the rest require only a
plurality. This is significant in that a deadlock is highly improbable in
these states. Furthermore, it is infrequent that no candidate receives a
majority in states requiring that amount for election. These facts seem to
have influenced the Court since they all deceptively indicate a limited
prospective impact of the decision, i.e., there will be few times when a
legislature must complete a popular election and, thus, violate the Gray
rule. Moreover, the only apparent alternatives to legislative action in the
event of a deadlock are expensive runoffs and new elections. However, a
constitutional right, especially one so sacred as voting rights, should
never be balanced against such practical considerations; notwithstanding,
this is exactly what the Court has done in Fortson v. Morris.
Charles R. Passafiume
CouRTs-Federal-State Relations-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
finds it highly inappropriate to clarify state law relevant to issues raised
in a federal court.
In Re Estate of Girard, 423 Pa. 297, 224 A.2d 761 (1966).
After an adverse decision in the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on matters of state law,' the trustees of Girard
College petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for a clarification
of the earlier Girard cases.2 The Pennsylvania court denied the petition,
holding that a due regard for the federal-state system precluded a
clarification;' the court emphatically cautioned that no implications were
to be drawn from their restraint.4
The action in the Federal District Court had been commenced by
guardians of Negro children to enjoin the discriminatory admission
27. As illustrated in the present case:
This is by statutory provision in North Carolina and by constitutional provision in
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
These states require only a plurality of popular votes to elect a governor while
Mississippi and Vermont require a majority and have the same provision as the others in
case of a deadlock in the popular election. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 234, 235 (1966).
1. Commonwealth v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (1966).
2. In Re Estate of Girard, 423 Pa. 297, 224 A.2d 761 (1966).
3. Id. at 297, 224 A.2d at 762.
4. Ibid.
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